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Black Labor on a White Canal:
West Indians in Panama, 1904-1980*

Michael L. Conniff
University of New Mexico

As a crossroads for world commerce, Panama has always attracted
outsiders.

Traders, laborers, and adventurers swarmed to the Isthmus

whenever new projects began.

Between 1850 and 1950, as many as 200,000

West Indian blacks traveled to Panama, the most voluminous trans-Caribbean
movement of people ever .

The high tides of migration occurred i n 1850-55

(the Panama Railroad), 1880-89 (the unsuccessful French canal), 1904-14
1

(the U.S. canal), and 1940-42 (the third locks project).

West Indians

saw Panama as a promised land with abundant jobs for the robust and easy
money for the clever .

They hoped that the journey to Panama wo u ld be the

end of the Diaspora.
In black historY,the Diaspora--or dispersal of Africans to many
parts of the world--continues.

The first stage saw tens of millions en-

slaved and sent from their homeland .

tn the second stage, their descen-

dants won freedom and became citizens of new countries.

Yet another stage

came, when poor blacks had to move again due to depressed economies, civil
wars, droughts, and overpopulation.

Those who migrated to Panama between

1850 and 1950 formed part of this new dispersion, because poor harvests and
competition from Cuba, Brazil, and beet sugar had ruined the island economies.

2

Did black West Indians who went to Panama escape the Diaspora?
Some did not, for they pushed on from there to other parts of the Americas
in search of better jobs and acceptance by the native populations.
of thousands came to the United States.

Tens

The majority did remain in Panama,

however, constituting the single largest immigrant community in the country.
Whether the West Indians who stayed in Panama eluded the Diaspora
is a subtler question.

They did to the extent that they found social accep-

tance and blended in with the local population without having to give up
their cultural traditions.

This process can be termed integration, meaning

accommodation in a pluralistic society, allowing members of minority groups
to retain their culture or adopt portions of the host culture without
stigmatization.

In concrete terms, West tndians and their descendants

could continue to

speak English, visit their families on the islands,

worship in Protestant churches, and enjoy British citizenship.
Another way out of the Diaspora was no escape at all.

That was

assimilation, whereby many West Indians consciously gave up their language,
British culture, religion, national ity, and even names to become like the
native Panamanians.

Brazilian writer Abdias do Nascimento called such a

process "cultural genocide."

A hypothetical case would be a Barbadian

named John White who became naturalized as Juan Blanco, converted from
Anglican to Catholic in order to marry Elena Fernandez, spoke Spanish at
home, sent his children (named Blanco Fernandez) to Panamanian schools, and
professed as much hatred for the Canal Zone gringos as his Latin neighbors
did.

For Nascimento and many West Indian descendants in Panama, such a

transformation represented psychological destruction for the individual and
cultural extinction for the group.

Many accepted this sort of assimi-

lation over the Diaspora, but the choice could never have been easy.
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The United States played a major role in both the West Indian migrations and in the integration/assimilation processes.

The government or

private companies (or both) undertook most construction and operation of
transport across Panama after 1850 and will continue to do so until the
expiration of the Carter-Torrijos Treaty in 1999.

American managers pre-

ferred to hire West Indians, and recruiters spent dozens of man-years on
the islands encouraging emigration.

Abundant, submissive, mostly Anglicized,

the West Indians formed the core of a labor system based upon third country
nationals.
Canal labor relations went through several phases.

In the nineteenth

century, white American or European managers oversaw racially mixed skilled
artisans and supervisors, who in turn drove gangs of black and mestizo
laborers.

Customarily Americans and Europeans received their pay in gold,

while West Indians and Latins were paid in local silver currency.

The work

force was generally too heterogeneous and transient for any formal split
labor system to operate, but gold pay connoted higher status.
In the construction days of the present canal (1904-14), Americans
perfected a segregated society whose components were distinguished by the
terms Gold Roll and Silver Roll .

These euphemisms poorly disguised a

system of Jim Crow as thorough as in the U.S. South.

C. Vann Woodward
2

has noted that imperial ist expansion went hand in hand with rising racism.
Once the Gold and Silver system became permanent, it allowed canal administrators to keep the West Indian workers in the position of third country
nationals competing with natives.

This labor regime became the single

greatest obstacle to West Indian integration in Panama, because it juxtapo~. ed

the interests of the immigrants and the host society.

4
Panama too played an important part in the migration and integration/
assimilation processes, usually in reaction to U.S. policies.

Panamanian

authorities first sought to regulate immigration by barring Chinese and
Middle Easterners.

When thousands of West Indians were laid off after 1914

and settled in Panama1s terminal cities, authorities passed a law against
entry of English-speaking blacks.

This and subsequent measures proved mildly

effective in stemming migration, but they led to defensiveness on the part
of the West Indians and their children.

Panamanian chauvinism during the

1930s and 1940s was the se cond gr eate st obstacle to West tndian integration.
Fo r a t ime the West Indians were a people without a home l and, caught in
a li mbo with only two exits: emigration or assimilation .
After World War I I, circumstances in the United States and Panama
turned favorable for the canal West Indian community.

The civil rights

movement gradually broke down the harshest aspects of segregation in the
Canal Zone.

Panamanians extended full citizenship to those of West Indian

descent and promoted interchange between them and the host society . Diplomacy drove the American changes, while politics hastened those in Panama.
The U.S. government reformed the canal labor system in order to diminish
its colonialist relationsh i p with Panama and to improve relations with
Latin America .

Treaty talks in the mid-1950s and after 1964 led to dis-

mantlement of the U.S. canal and its third country labor system.

Panamanians

took steps to eradicate discrimination against the descendants of the West
tndians, thereby encouraging integration over assimilation.
Although the Carter-Torrijos Treaty cancelled some benefits enjoyed
by canal employees, it forced West Indian descendants to make a far more
auspisious choice than any faced by their forebears: between integration and
3
emigration to the United States. For them the Diaspora has ended.
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The Colonialist Labor System of the Canal Zone
The American canal project relied heavily though not exclusively
on West Indian labor.

The canal labor force

the ten years of construction.

~me

together piecemeal over

Seven hundred West Indians remained on the

payroll of the French company which had sold its rights to the U.S. government.

Tens of thousands more came, recruited in the islands at first and

then drawn voluntarily by the promise of good wages.
three-quarters of the total work force.

They constituted about

American tradesmen and craftsmen

usually signed on at the New York offices of the canal.

Recruiters offered

top wages, free transportation and lodging, recreation facilities, medical
care, and generous vacations.

After early scares of epidemics had passed,

American workers showed up in large numbers.

Spaniards, Italians, and

4
Greeks also contracted for three-year tours with the canal.
John Stevens, chief

engineer in the early days, insisted on em-

ploying workers from several sources.

liMy notion is that we should not

attempt to prosecute this work without the introduction of at least
three separate nationalities.

. so that none of them will get the idea

that they are the only source of supply on the earth.11
soon endorsed that approach.

Theodore Roosevelt

Stevens's policy--the third country labor

system discussed above--remained in effect throughout most of the history
of the canal.

It encouraged competition among the various employee groups,

while relying primarily on a group of aliens, in this case the West Indians.
The latter were disadvantaged in relation to the employer (the U.S. government) and the host society (Panama), whose citizens viewed the aliens as
5
competitors and undesirables.
Canal administrators described the West Indians as poor workers who,
with the right training and supervision, could be molded into acceptable

6
employees.

They treated the blacks with the same paternalism that the

"kind1y p1anter" gave his former slaves after emancipation .

Labor relations

so resembled those of the South that people mistakenly thought that most
6

American employees hailed from there.

In fact most were Northerners.

The British government looked after the interests of the West Indians by intervening with u.S. or Panamanian authorities.

They worked with

a succession of West Indian

committe~s

and organ i zations formed to promote

the welfare of immigrants.

The poverty of the islands, however, prevented

either the Foreign or Col oni a l Office from encouraging mass repatriation.
After the heavy construction ended in 1914, an over-abundant labor supply
depressed wages in Panama.

The British government did all it could to

help the unemployed short of sending large numbers home.

In this way

they allowed the canal's third country labor system to continue.
The racial segregation instituted through the Gold and Silver rolls
also reinforced the third country labor system, exaggerating and codifying
its most exploitat i ve aspects.

The designations gold and silver were attached

to pay windows, toilets, commissaries, quarters, clinics, recreation facilities, postal windows, and virtually everything else.

Canal managers avoided

admission of color segregat ion in public because its legal ity was questionable under both the u.S. and Panamanian constitutions, and because the
Republican Party still claimed to be defender of black people.

Yet the

gold-silver system bore a strong resemblance to the codified racism of
Afrikanerdom and the Deep South.

7

Racial segregation created a complex set of privileges used to coopt
leaders of the West Indian community and to divide their followers. For
example, Zone officials kept a few well-to-do or talented West Indians on
the Gold roll and paid them higher wages to show that the barrier was not

7
impermeable .

This induced moderation in the actions of many non-U.S. citi-

zens, who hoped they might qualify for promotion to the coveted Gold roll .
Zone officials also played upon natural divisions and rivalries among nonwhites.

The few U.S. blacks on the payroll enjoyed an intermediate position

between gold and silver and were used to keep the \.Jest Indian blacks in
line.

Some "white Jamaicans," light skinned, educated, and anxious to be

accepted by

Zonia~s ,

served the same purpose.

The greatest schism in the work force, of course, lay between West
Indians and Panamanians.

The latter were racially heterogeneous, Including

a f ew wh i tes , many mestizos, some Amerindians, and the so-called colonial
bl acks, descended from the days of the Spanish s l ave trade.

Most Latins

felt a preference for lightness of skin, a preference that was reinforced by
Zone segregation policies.

Thus racism exacerbated rivalry between West

Indians and Panamanians. even when they real ized that the Zone officials
exploited them both.
In the 1940s. a time of intense pressure to reform the Canal Zone.
the governor could still confidently predict the demise of the silver labor
union, composed as it was "of two essentially incompatible elements--Latin
Americans and West Indian Negroes - -and I believe that if it is allowed to
go its way unmolested It will soon begin to lose strength and eventually
8
perhaps fall apart.
If Panamanians had any doubts about white supremacy. they got the
message in 1910.

The president and first vice president had both died, so

Liberal Party leader Carlos Mendoza succeeded to the highest office.

A

mulatto. Mendoza enjoyed great popularity among the black and mestizo lower
classes of the cities.

He announced that he would have the Liberal majority

in the National Assembly choose him to finish out the 1908-12 term.

The

8
chief of the canal, George Goethals, did not relish the prospect of dealing
with a black, however, and Panamanian Conservatives urged him to declare
Mendoza ineligible.

~

The U. S. charge, acting with Goethal

IS

approval,

convinced the State Department that Mendoza should be barred from office.
He then got Mendoza to desist, in exchange for a promise that he would be
minister of finance.

The charge then tried to dictate who would be interim

president by threatening mil itary intervention and even annexation. Neither
Goethals nor President Taft cared who the Assembly chose, but they feared
that the chargels continue d meddling would jeopardize friendly relations in
9
the regio ~. They called him home and the incident passed.
The Panamanian elfte recognized that Americans only wanted to deal
wfth whites, so they came to an understanding.

Both would cooperate in

keeping the nonwhite populations of Panama and the Zone in a subordinate
position.
The 1920 silver strike dramatically tested these labor controls and
proved them sound.

The silver force had fallen from 25,000 in 1913 to

17,000 rn 1920, and wages had not kept up with the cost of 1 iving.

The

squeeze was especially acute for those West Indians who had families and
remained as permanent canal employees.
1919, but they quickly dissipated.

Small strikes broke out in 1916 and

In 1919, however, representatives of the

Detroit-based United Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees and Railroad Shop Laborers began to organize the silver workers, promising hardhitting leadership.

By early 1920 they had signed up about 80 percent and

began to demand better pay and fringe benefits.

A national rail strike

threat in the United States, plus an intransigent attitude on the part of
the canal administration, sparked a nearly complete walk-off by 17,000
10
workers in February 1920.
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Despite a successful first week, leaders soon told the men to return
to work due to lack of strike funds.
on native and West Indian workers .

The failure left a deep impression
The principal leader, Barbadian William

Stoute, had little experience in union affairs and misread signals from
Detroit.

The brotherhood neither officially sanctioned the strike nor

sent help, yet it was expelled from the American Federation of Labor (AFL)
for encouraging the canal strikers.

This left a 30-year legacy of distrust

toward U.S. unions. The government of Panama, at first neutral in the dispute, took action aga ins t the strike rs a fter the governor of the canal
threatened to send over marines.

West Indians long viewed thrs as a betrayal

by the Panamanians.

And neither group trusted the leadership of the other

in subsequent years.

Had the work force consisted wholly of West Indians

or Panamanians, the strike might have succeeded.

Its failure reinforced

the divisions created by the third country labor system.
The strike and congressional criticism of excessive Gold roll benefits prompted the Harding administration to conduct an investigation of
canal operations in 1921.

The panel, called the Connor Board, concluded that

mi smanagement riddled the canal organization and that the best solution
would be to replace most American employees with West Indians and Panamanians .
This solution, called silverization, met with adamant opposition from the U.S.citizen unions, because it endangered their jobs and the gold-silver division.
And without gold supervisors, the silver workers might succeed in unionizing
and even dismantling the third country labor system itself.
canal administration and the AFL in Washington

The entire

campaigned against the

Connor Board recommendations, which eventually died for lack of enforcement.
The silverization threat always remained, however, and the gold unions
11

hardened their resolve to keep the silver workers in their places.
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For the next quarter of a century, no unions existed among the
s ilver worke r s.

The

subse~vient

Panama Canal West Indian Employees Asso-

ciation (PCWIEA, 1924-1959) achieved modest gains over the years, but it
rarely had more than a thousand members and represented mostly its president, Samuel Whyte.

Canal files contain much correspondence from the
12
PCWIEA, most of it answered politely but in the negative.
Since the
PCWIEA admitted only West Indians and their children, Latin employees had
to form their own group, the Sociedad Paname~a y Latinoamericana de Traba-

jadores de la Zona del Canal (1921-7), led by Luis A. V~tor in the 1920s
and Jorge A. Panay in the 1930s .

In 1941 a socialist Latin group, the

Soc iedad de Panamenos al Servicio del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos,
developed under the leadership of V~tor Urrutia, a friend of politician
Francisco (Pancho) Arias P.

This group challenged the canal administration

in 1943-45 to comply with a 1936 treaty promise that Panamanians would enj oy job opportunities and pay equal to

u.s.

citizens.

The Sociedad di d not,

however , attempt to represent descendants of West Indians or, for that
matter, even dark-skinned Panamanians.

Thus the color line continued to
13
reinforce the third country labor system.

Chauvinism Versus Integration
Even when the West Indians decided to stay in Panama to become permanent
canal employees, the divisions continued.

They and their children were

ostracized by Latin Panamanians, legally, racially, and ethnically.

A

representative statement was Olmedo Alfaro's El peligro antillano, 2nd ed.
(Panama: Imprenta Nacional, 1925), which predicted that black immigration
and higher birth rates would swamp Panama with unassimilable hordes.

Mis-

11
cegenation presented a threat, since it corrupted the lighter Spanish American stock.
In 1925 a new danger arose: social upheaval.

The Panamanian govern-

ment and elite regarded the immigrant West Indians as a source of profits.
In 1925 they raised taxes and rents by as much as 50 percent.

Some labor

leaders managed to start a rent strike that degenerated into riots and looting.
The u.S. marines finally restored peace, at the cost of several lives and
Panama ' s wounded sovereignty.

Few West Indians participated in the events,

yet the public believed that they we re responsible for the rising cost of
14
li v i ng. To some, they were a perfect scapegoat.
A series of laws beginning in 1926 branded as undesirables "Negroes
whose native language is not Spanish," i.e. West Indians.

In 1928 the

legislature amended the constitution to withhold citizenship until the 21st
15
birthday from children of undesirables, even though born in Panama.
In
1941 President Arnulfo Arias promulgated a new constitution which denied
citizenship to undesirables born after 1928 and barred their naturalization
altogether.

These measures denationalized about 20,000 Panamanians of West

Indian descent. and created hardsliip for the remaining 30,000 members of the
community .

The legal restrict ions were lifted in 1945 , but a few remained
16
on the books until 1961.
Public ostracism of the West Indians coincided with these legal
measures.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, pejorative terms such as "chombo"

were commonly applied to the West Indians, and between 1931 and 1933 violent
demonstrations occurred to protest the presence of jobless undesirables in
17
Panama ' s cities.
Besides economic competition, racism inspired Panamanian rejection
of West Indians and their children.

The British minister reported in 1932

12
that Panamanians "fear the possible advent to power of this new [immigrant]
class; they dread the prospect of a black president; and they are resolved
that the position shall not be further aggravated by the admission to the
country of fresh immigrants of African race."

Harmodio Arias, the first

president to receive electoral support from the children of West Indians
born in Panama, nonetheless called attention
t he dangers of nonwhite imm igration.

in his 1932 inaugural to

Besides contributing to already high

levels of unemployment, rt would encourage miscegenation and undermine the
racial stock of the country.

The latter was already highly miscegenated,

except for the small white elite, and many Panamanians regarded more Negroes
as a genetic threat.

Meanwhile the supervisrng engineer

~nd

future gover-

nor} of the canal avoided mixed Panamanian-West tndian work gangs, due to
18
Gradually, legal and social disracial antagonism and language problems.
crimination permeated Panamanian-West Indian relations in the 1930s.
After World War I I the pattern of rejection shifted.
ments to West Indian integration

replaced

. legal

Soc i al impedi-

ones . ...

By this time members of the West Indian community enjoyed better economic
standing, and some had risen to respectable jobs in the canal and in Panama.
Yet subtle rules segregated them .

Some residential districts reserved for

elite Panamanians and white foreigners were off-limits to the West Indians
and their descendants.
Certain

Many restaurants and taverns refused to serve them.

businesses and the government itself hired almost no persons of

West Indian descent.

Newspaper employment ads indicated this by the phrase,

"persons of good appearance only . "
ethnic.

Discrimination was both racial and

These new chauvinist manifestations were in part learned from Ameri-

cans in the Zone and in part derived from the legal restrictions of the previous thirty years.

Such prejudices were neither as deep rooted nor Insti-

13
tutiona li zed as those of the Canal Zone, yet they have been difficult to
19
erad i cate .
Panamanian rejection of the West Indians and their descendants
produced a slow and flawed integration.
secure in Panama.

The West Indian immigrants felt in-

They banded together in self-defense, reducing inter-

action with the natives.

The immigrants taught their children to avoid
,.J

cont act wi th Panaman i ans, for whom many used t he derogatory term IIPanas .11
West Indians of means preferred to send their children to private English
schools or even to Jamaica for their education.

The hostility of Panamanians

a I so caused the \ves t I nd i ans and the i r ch i 1dren to take refuge in Cana I
Zone l i fe and employment.

Yet their identification with the United States

gave the Panamanians more evidence of their unwillingness to acculturate.
20
Chauvinism and cultural defensiveness thus bred on one another .
West Indian defensiveness took many forms, some separatist, some
constructive. Chapters of the Universal Negro Improvement Association,
founded by black nationalist Marcus Garvey, raised money for black businesses
and eventual relocation to Africa.

Some persisted into the 1950s. Many

unemployed persons returned to the islands or moved elsewhere in search of
work .

A long ser ies of West Indian defense comm i ttees dating f rom 1919

attempted to unify the numerous associations and to get British diplomatic
protection.

And some leaders argued that birth in the Canal Zone should

carry U.S. citizenship, especially after Congress i n 1932 conferred citizenship on inhabitants of the nearby Virgin Islands.
21
strategies failed.

For the most part these

Perhaps the most constructive defense mechanism of the West Indian
community was getting control over their childrenls education.

The private

schools that had existed since early days were not especially good and were

14
beyond the reach of most working class families .

Panamanian schools did

not take i n many children of West Indians, because of overcrowding and language problems. That left the Canal Zone colored schools .

By gaining par-

tial control of curriculum and teacher training, a few leaders in the 1930s
and 1940s managed to shape the next generation of Panamanians of West Indian
descent.
Some of the earliest Canal Zone schools had mixed student bodies,
composed of West Indian blacks, Panamanians, and a few whites.

But in 1906

the canal took over the schools, which were then segregated into white and
nonwhite.
schools.

Light Panamanian children from good famil ies enrolled in the white
From then on whites received superior education, while nonwhites

got second-class training. - Less-qualified

Jamaican teachers hired for

the colored schools were paid less; their buildings were dilapidated and
overcrowded; and they worked with textbooks discarded from the white schools.
Administrators made no pretense of maintaining separate but equal facili ties: white students achieved at U.S. levels, wh i le blacks performed worse
\

22

than Panamanians or blacks in the United States.
A 1930 Columbia University report on the Canal Zone schools put some
pressure on authorities to raise standards for the blacks.

"No adequate

consideration has ever been given to the problem of meeting the needs of
the Negro in the Canal Zone school.

Beyond question , this problem, fraught

as it is with social, political, and economic considerations, must be faced
boldly and intelligently.

Upon its solution depends the general welfare

of thousands of Negroes in the Canal Zone, and , perhaps, of the Zone itself."
In response to such criticism, authorities revamped the upper grades to
stress vocat ional education, on the grounds that the students would be future
23

laborers on the canal.

15
A few West Indian youths had gone to the United States for college
degrees and returned to assume leadership roles in the community.

One of

them, Alfred Osborne, had a major influence in the field of elementary education. A naturalized U.S . citizen when he returned, Osborne trained a new
cadre of colored school teachers, in the La Boca normal school class of 193538.

He imbued them with Dewey's New School philosophy and a sense of their

mission in training the next generation. This approach held that children
should be the center of the educational process .
roles in society should determine curricula.

Their interests and future

Children must participate

ac ti vely in learn i ng, rather than be the passive recipients of information.
Osborne became an apostle of the New School movement in Panama.
Osborne consciously cut ties with West tndian education and culture
and set out to Americanize the schools.

He and others devised a curriculum

paper that can be seen as a benchmark for the integration process as a whole.
The New School bias made their recommendations emphasize adaptation to t he
local environment. "Any guidance by the school that will help [students] become better and more efficient employees will be a splendid contribution
The group's greatest contribut i on

"

. . . is to exemplify that sp i rit of service

He and h is aides also favored incorporating "Into Panamanian nat ion-

ality a good nucleus of potential citizens." "The opportunity to acquaint
the children in our

school~

with the language, the home life, the traditions,

the colorful religious observances, and the htstory of the Panamanian people
should be largely seized upon in developing a civIc intellfgence and in enlarging the horizon of sympathetic understanding between this group and the
group of native Panamanians of Latin origin."
Osborne, who had majored in Spanish literature, gave special importance to

language, both correct English and Spanish, for promotion of the

16

children's welfare.

Languages were essential tools for integration. This

mi d-1930s assessment of the mission of the black schools revealed a strong
attachment to the Canal Zone (which operated the schools and sustained the
community) but also an emerging ideal of combining

in the school curriculum

24
the best of American, West I"ndian, and Lati"n American cultures.
The 1941 Constitution and st fngy budgets during the war discouraged
t eachers f rom stressing Spanish and Panamanian culture, so 1 ittle progress
was made toward integration in the 19405.

Then two rude shocks in 1954

and 1955 forced the is s ue : conversion of the schools to a Spanish curriculum
and the 1955 Eisenhower-RemOn Treaty.

Both were made wit hout consult i ng the

West Indian community and both proved detrimental to its interests .

Yet in

the long run (and despite the motives of U.S. and Panamanian authorities),
these

mid~1950s

changes forced those of West Indian descent to make long-

deferred choices about their identity.
The conversion of the schools proved one of the most controversial
West Indian experiences in the Zone.

Canal authorities had anxiously watched

early desegregation decisions by the White House and the Supreme Court and
realized that they might face similar orders.

The Zone had already acquired

an unsavory reputation for Jim Crow practices , and the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) pressed Eisenhower to end the

segregated schools .

In early 1954, Zone authorities decided to make the

colored schools into "Latin American ones," justifying it as necessary to f8mil iarize the students with their language, history, government, and customs.
They went through the files and compiled a list of requests and suggestions
urging such changes .

To admit they had previously done nothing to promote

25
integration was embarrassing but not as unacceptable as racial integration.

17
The callousness and rapidity of the conversion, done with 1 ittle
pl ann i ng or teacher training, still angers those who lived through it. Osborne
terms it ruthless and bel ieves it led to the retirement and early death of
the superintendent.

Audley Webster says it created "a bastard educational

system," neither ' American nor Panamanian.

Perhaps most important, the con-

version ended once and for all the idea that the canal administration was
benevolent and could be trusted to act in the best interests of the community.
From then on, teachers and supervisors took control (and occasionally violated
policy) to create a bilingual, cosmopolitan school system which in many
26
achieved the ideals enunciated in the 1930s curriculum study.

way~

The 1955 Treaty, a majo r turning point in U.S.-Panamanian relations,
provided an even larger shock and forced integration on the West Indian community.

The treaty ended commissary privileges for the 80 percent of non-

cit i zen employees res iding

outs~de

the Zone.

Even before that, the admini-

stration had decided to curtail housing and community serv i ces for nonc i tizens .
Th i s pol i cy , known as depopu l ation, gradually reduced the noncit i zen residents from 6,100 in 1950 to 1,500 in 1972.

By the latter date only 13 per-

cent of nonc i tizen employees had Zone housing and commissary benefits. To
ma ke th i ngs worse, Panama gained the right to tax the income of its cit i zens
employed by the canal.

The only offsetting benefits for descendants of the

West rndians were promises of a contributory retirement system, improved
27
employment opportunities, and equal pay under a single wage system.
The net effect of the 1955 Treaty was to drive descendants of the
West Indians out of the Zone and to curtail their income and fringe benefits.
Many decided not to accept the new terms and em i grated to the United States
under the I iberal rules of the period.

Those who stayed suffered a decline

in their living standard, lost faith in their unions, and became alienated from

18

u.s.

canal administrators.

But at least their children, now admitted into

28

Panamanian schools, learned good Spanish and local customs.

Decl ine of the Third Country Labor System
Pressures from a variety of sources after 1943 had forced Zone
officials to begin dismantling the colontal ist labor system.

Liberal Pana-

manians captured the government in 1945 and embraced the descendants of West
Indians as full citizens requiring protection against the discriminatory
practices of the Zone.

A new generati-on of leaders emerged ion the West tn-

dian community as well, one cognizant of their Panamanian nationality and
willing to use more forceful means to achieve decent treatment in the Zone
and genuine integration in Panama.

Finally, many agencies of the U.S.

government urged reform in order to improve relations with Latin America as
a whole.

By the late 1940s, discriminatory and inequitable socioeconomic
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policies of the Canal Zone were a decided embarrassment.
Pancho Arias and his Renovador Party broke boldly with the past in
1945 by forc i ng the revocat i on of ant i -\o/es t t nd ian 1aws and by organ i zing
the community for elections In 1946.

An old-fashioned liberal, Arias be-

lieved in equality of opportunity and welcomed those of West Indian descent
(now called criollos) into the Panamanian family.

One observer suggested

that Arias possessed an over-developed father complex, which might also be
30
termed a populist instrnct.
Most criollos accepted the invitation to parti'cipate in elections, and they naturally supported the Renovador Party.
Pancho Arias's untimely death in 1946 kept him from winning the presidency,
but his party continued to enjoy the support of the criollos until It split
31
in 1960.
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Even Arnu1fo Arias M. (no relation to Pancho), who had acted viciously
toward them i n 1941, courted crfo110 voters in 1947-48 by assuring them

tha~

he had changed his ways and now recogni'zed the contributi'ons West Indi.ans
had made to the progress of the natron.
tRe Zoni3ns,

The rear cu1prits,he aver'r ed, were

who kept those of West I' ndian descent isolated

of their Panamanian national heritage.

and~gnorant

Paradoxical as it seems, growing

numbers of criollos believed in Arnulfo, and by 1968 about half voted for

32
their former nemes i s.
Although the crfollo vo t e he l ped decide presidential elect ions between 1948 and 1968, the West Indian community made only modest polit i cal
ga i ns.

Typically party bosses recruited criollo leaders but did not honor

post-election commitments.

True, several dozen crio110s won elective or

appo i ntive posts in that period, but they were usually passed over for
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important positions.
George Westerman, for example, who enjoyed tremendous prestige in
the 1950s and supported the Renovador ticket (by then part of the broader
Coa1icibn), made little headway in politics.

tn 1953 President Remon pre-

sented him with the nation's highest medal, that of Vasco NGnez de Balboa,
and three years later Westerman went to t he UN as Panama ' s ambassador. At
the same time he became broker for criollo polit i cal appointments and persona1 adviser to President de 1a Guardia.

He was ripe for a ministerial

position (housing would have been appropriate), but instead he stepped back
into private life in 1960, disappointed at how little he and his people had
achieved.

In elections that year some 31,000 crio110s voted in Panama pro-

vince alone, and perhaps that many more in Colon province. They cast
almost a quarter of the total votes.
;~ationa1

Yet only one crio110 made it to the

Assembly, due to divisions, broken promises, and gerrymandering.
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By then Westerman had become publ isher of the leading West Indian weekly,
the Panama Tribune; he was rumored to be a candidate for secretary general
of the UN; yet at home he was out in the cold politically, and so were his
34
people.
The rise of criollo pol itics did help both Latin and West Indian
employees in the Canal Zone for a time.

Panamanian leaders, having purged

racist legislation from the books, took aim at discriminatory practices in
the Zone. They pointed to the differential pay and benefits of the Gold
and Silver rolls, contrary to the promise of equal ity in the 1936 Treaty.
They alleged that racism was the principal reason for the unequal treatment.
Accusations of discrimination

raised in such international bodies as the

UN, the ILO, and the OAS, put the United States on the defensive.

From

1943 until the 1977 treaty, use of this Panamanian strategy slowly won
35
better treatment for nationals employed In the Canal Zone.
In 1946 Zone officials allowed the CIO-affiliated United Public
Workers of America (UPWA) to organize silver employees into Local 713, and
in a short time they represented a majority of the noncitizen workers.

Taking

their cue from UPWA officers in Washington, Local 713 leaders tried to
bridge the gap between Spanish and English, between Latin and West Indian members.

Their newspaper, Accion, was printed in both languages, and they con-

sciously put Spanish-surnamed individuals on the board of directors. They
also established informal links with the Panamanian ministry of labor and
with union leaders, so that their activities would be mutually supportive.
The peak of such collaboration occurred In 1954, when Ed Gaskin (head of Local
900, heir to Local 713) appeared In a mass meeting with President Remon to
36
pledge solidarity with Panama in treaty talks.
Canal Zone authorities became vindictive, however, when unions col-
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laborated with Panama in denouncing discrimination.

When such criticism be-

came too strident, they struck back with chilling effect.

For example, long-

~

time West Indian leader Cespedes Burke was fired in 1948 for union
as were former Local 713 officers in 1953.

activitie~,

Throughout most of 1949 the

Panama Canal and the State Department denied passports to UPWA representatives, isolating the union at a time when a major struggle was occurring
in U.S. labor circles.

When UPWA was expelled from the CIO in early 1950

for alleged communist ties, Local 713 collapsed and was replaced by Local
900, affiliated with a rival CIO international.

Finally, Gaskin's flirta-

tion with Rembn in 1953-54 so angered Zone officials that they took retaliatory measures and eventually denied him leave-of-absence for union work.
37
Local 900 almost succumbed In 1956.
The Zone labor alliance with Panama c061ed in the mld-1950s, due
not only to action by canal officials but to Panamanian diplomatic

victorie~.

Gaskin and the others real ized that in the long run Panama sought to win a
larger share in the operations and profits of the canal, and that the attack
on discrimination was only one element of that campaign.

The 1955 Treaty

gave ample proof that Panama's gain could be their 109s.

This realization

has conditioned Zone unions' relations with Panama ever since, making labor
grimly protective of hard-earned benefits that Panama would like to scale
down.

Union leaders know that salaries and fringes will drop when Panama
38
takes over the canal.
Finally, pressure to end the third country labor system of the Canal

Zone came from other branches of the U.S. government.

The State Department

continuously fought to improve the bad image which colonialism and racism
caused in Latin America and urged Zone officials to apply Frankl in Roosevelt's
Executive Order 8802 on employing minorities in defense industries and to
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comply with the 1936 promise of equal opportunities for Panamanians.
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Nicaraguan newspaperman Guillermo Chamorro and Mexican labor boss Vicente
Lombardo Toledano urged Roosevelt to end racism and discrimination in 1943
and 1944, and Vice President Wallace, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Frances Perkins were all approached during 1944 regarding injustices in the Zone.
velt called Governor Mehaffey to Washington to discuss the matter.

Roo~e-

The

president was not as concerned about the problem as Mehaffey feared, but
the meeting revealed that other agencies had begun to take a reforming In40
terest in the Canal Zone.
Cl early a n Allied victory in 1945 would bring
more pressure to democratize and humanize the canal.
In the years following the war,

in~erdepartmental

meetings

studded

the Canal Zone calendar, and several intensive investigations by outside
agencies yielded scathing attacks on racial and national discrimination. In
all, these deliberations involved the armed services, Commerce, Interior,
State, the National Housing Agency, Congress, Civil Service, the General
Accounting Office (GAO), the White House, and the Supreme Court.

As for

outside investigations, those of General Frank McSherry, George Vietheer,
and the Bureau of the Budget proved to be blockbusters.

These studies con-

eluded that canal operations wasted money on unnecessary luxuries and fringe
benefits, while mismanaging labor relations in such a way as to embarrass
the United States.

They usually made the distinction between race segrega-

tion--which should be ended--and the dual wage system, which should be reformed to guarantee equal pay for the same work.

The GAO in particular

objected to the fringe benefits given to U. S. c i tizens which made the Zone
"Southern Comfort" for the privileged and awakened feelings of resentment in
all the rest. Undersecretary of Army Karl Bendetsen enforced the austerity
41
measures in the early 1950s with exceptional zeal.
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Racial segregation diminished gradually throughout the postwar era,
aga i n as a result of reforms imposed from the outside.

The hated gold-silver

system ended in 1948, but separate facilities for Americans and Panamanians
continued for decades afterward .

u.s.

blacks enrolled in the formerly-white

schools after the 1954 conversion, yet school segregation was still 95 percent effective.

By the 1960s housing segregation was less obvious because

so many Panamanians had been moved out of the Zone.
Yet when black

u.s.

-Congressmen began to visit the Zone i n the 1970s,

it looked like the South in the 1920s.

The army itself took measures to

end Cana l Zone racism, a quarter century after the histor i c decision to desegregate the armed services.

A visiting Equal Employment Opportun i ty

officer in 1973 described the racial situation as quite bad, wIth four layers
of privi lege: Zone whites, light-skinned Panamanians, West Indian descendants,
and American blacks.

He thought "it was high time someone brought Zonians
42
into the twentieth century."
The year 1974 saw a concerted campaign against race discr iminat ion

in the Zone, especially important because the United States resumed treaty
negotiations with Panama .
the defensi ve in any talks.

Racism and inequal ity put the United States on
Black army off i cer Minton Francis and industr i el

relations specialist Peter Pestillo . investigated labor practices and recommended elimination of

seg~egation.

Meanwhile, Congressman Robert Leggett,

chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Panama Canal, conducted hearings
in which descendants of the West Indians complained of injustices and mistreatment.

Leggett also requested a special GAO study of differential sala 43
ries and benefits for citizens and noncitizens.
These intrusions by out-

siders shook the Canal Zone to its foundations and caused many old-timers
to retire rather than see the Zonian way of life destroyed.
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The denouement came quickly.

In November 1975, Governor Parfitt

announced three decisions which in the eyes of the old-timers spelled the
end of Zone life as they had known it.

Parfitt promised to merge the edu-

cational systems of U.S. citizen and noncitizen children, giving the latter
the option of attending

U.S~

or Panamanian schools.

Second, he decided

to reduce the number of positions designated "securitY,11 or tenable only by
U.S. citizens.

Finally, he announced that housing would be assigned entirely

on the basis of grade and seniority, thereby eliminating racial and national
criteria .

White American Zonians raised considerable protest over these

re f orms , even to the point of jeopardizing negot i at ions wi t h Panama .

But i n

the end they failed, because most government observers believed they were
necessary for the achievement of treaties with Panama.

Black Congressman

Ralph Metcalfe, new chairman of the Panama Canal subcommittee, pushed hard to
assure that the decisions were carried out over the next few years.

Discri-

mination had gone from being an embarrassment to being an obstacle to Ameri-
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can foreign policy.
The Treaty of 1977 and its implementation under the Panama Canal Act
of 1979 are too recent for full appraisal by historians, but some analysts

45
have already discussed their impact on the West Indian community.

The des -

cendants of the original West Indian immigrants divided over the effects,
with Zone residents openly opposed and most others indifferent or In favor,
for political reasons.

Unquestionably, the 1,500 or so noncitizen

employees in the Zone lost a number of benefits, and most were "in the mood
to go to the United States under special immigration provisions of the Act.
But few of those who already lived in Panama suffered ill effects.

Indeed,

the treaty negotiations had induced canal officials to effect improvements
that many employees never expected to see.

While most West Indian descen-
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dants accepted the treaty in principle, all were apprehensive about enactment and urged the unions to safeguard their benefits.

They knew that the

important decisions will come in the 1990s, when Panama assumes a larger role
fn management and will attempt to equalize salartes and benefits inside and
outside the Zone.
From most appearances, the West tndran community has made the final
decision to remain in Panama.

Fewer emigrated than expected, and many went

not with rancor but simply to establish residency in the United States.
The irony is that some who had left in the 1960s returned to take jobs with
Panama's new Panama Canal Authority.

The Panamanians of West Indian descent

have finally escaped the Diaspora.

By way of conclusion, it is worth recalling that the United States
built the canal at the high tide of its imperial ism and racism, but that
institutions at home evolved more quickly than those abroad.

West Indian

immigrants who worked on the canal were victims of triple jeopardy: as third
country nationals, as blacks in a white supremacist system, and as outcasts
ion Panama.

By the end of World War I t such treatment was anachronistic in

Western society, yet decades passed before the immigrants and their descendants
became full citizens of Panama and enjoyed normal employee rights in the canal.
Panamanian chauvinism declined quickly, due in part to criollo pol itics in
the 1940s and 1950s. The generation of West Indian descendants that came of age
in 1945 led the community with much skill.

Zone management, though, proved

the hardest to reform, and vestiges of third country labor exploitation and
segregation persisted until the 1970s.

Only when faced with radical changes

under a new treaty and near-unanimous pressure from other agencies did the
Zonians

relinqui~h

the advantages they had enjoyed for 75 years.
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